Path traversal in /experiment/models/preview allows arbitrary image file read
7.5
High
CVSS 3.1 base
What to do
If you run ComfyUI before 0.28.0, upgrade to 0.28.0 or later.
Anyone who can reach it over the network, with no account and no user interaction, can read sensitive data.Read from the CVSS 3.1 vector
To exploit it
What it gets
My analysis of this finding: root cause, the vulnerable code, the impact and the fix, in the site’s format. The official advisory of record is linked above.
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
ComfyUI | pip | < 0.28.0 | 0.28.0 |
ComfyUI exposes an experimental model preview route that joins an attacker controlled path segment straight into os.path.join() with no containment check. By percent encoding the traversal sequence (%2e%2e%2f for ../), I could step out of the model directory and have the server read, render and return arbitrary image files from the host filesystem. This was co-discovered with the CISA coordinated disclosure (VU#150407) and assigned CVE-2026-56671.
The handler is in app/model_manager.py, route /experiment/models/preview/{folder}/{path_index}/{filename:.*}:
@routes.get("/experiment/models/preview/{folder}/{path_index}/{filename:.*}")async def get_model_preview(request): folder_name = request.match_info.get("folder", None) path_index = int(request.match_info.get("path_index", None)) filename = request.match_info.get("filename", None) if folder_name not in folder_paths.folder_names_and_paths: return web.Response(status=404) folders = folder_paths.folder_names_and_paths[folder_name] folder = folders[0][path_index] full_filename = os.path.join(folder, filename) previews = self.get_model_previews(full_filename)The bugpath_index indexes the folder list with no bounds checkThe bugjoins the attacker path segment with no containment check
filename comes from the {filename:.*} match, which captures everything including slashes. There is no commonpath check before the join, unlike the rest of ComfyUI’s file code (for example get_save_image_path() in folder_paths.py, which does validate containment).
The trick that makes it reachable is that aiohttp normalizes real ../ segments in the path but does not decode %2f as a separator during that normalization. So a fully percent encoded payload survives routing and lands in the handler decoded:
GET /experiment/models/preview/checkpoints/0/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd
-> filename = "../../etc/passwd"
-> os.path.join(folder, "../../etc/passwd") # escapes the model folder
Every ComfyUI endpoint is unauthenticated by default, so this is a pre-auth primitive. The resolved path is handed to PIL and re-encoded to WEBP before being returned, which gives a reliable read of any image file the server process can open, anywhere on disk. In a multi-user or shared deployment that means reading other users’ generated outputs and input uploads, and the 200 versus 404 response acts as a file-existence oracle for probing filesystem layout.
Two secondary defects sit in the same handler: path_index is cast with int() and indexed with no bounds check, so an out-of-range value throws and returns a 500 (an unauthenticated DoS), and a negative index reaches unexpected directories.
Resolve the candidate path and confirm it stays inside the intended folder before touching it:
full_filename = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(folder, filename))if os.path.commonpath((os.path.abspath(folder), full_filename)) != os.path.abspath(folder): return web.Response(status=400)The fixresolves the joined path before checking itThe fixrejects resolved paths that leave the model folder
The same commonpath discipline already used in get_save_image_path() should apply here, and path_index needs a range check before it indexes folders[0].
Sanaan Fayaz Wani (GitHub sfwani) reported this vulnerability to the ComfyUI maintainers under coordinated disclosure and is credited as a reporter in GHSA-pj59-g5vv-74q4, published 2026-07-15.
All published findings: advisory index.