Hatchet: Cross-Tenant Durable Task Event Log Disclosure via Missing Authorization Check
6.3
Medium
CVSS 3.1 base
What to do
If you run hatchet before 0.91.1, upgrade to 0.91.1 or later.
Anyone who can reach it over the network, with a low-privilege account and no user interaction, given conditions outside the attacker's control, can read sensitive data, and the impact reaches beyond the vulnerable component.Read from the CVSS 3.1 vector
To exploit it
What it gets
My analysis of this finding: root cause, the vulnerable code, the impact and the fix, in the site’s format. The official advisory of record is linked above.
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet | go | < 0.91.1 | 0.91.1 |
Hatchet authorizes most tenant-scoped API routes by declaring a list of resources the request touches, and the middleware validates tenant membership only when "tenant" is among them. The GET /api/v1/stable/durable-tasks/{durable-task} endpoint (listDurableEventLog) declares x-resources: ["durable-task"] and omits "tenant". The populator never puts a tenant in the request context, the membership check is skipped, and any authenticated user can read the durable task event log of any tenant given a task UUID. I verified this against v0.86.29.
The authorization decision hinges on a single conditional. api/v1/server/authz/middleware.go:
func (a *AuthZ) validateUserTenantPermissions(c echo.Context, r *middleware.RouteInfo) error { unauthorized := echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, "Not authorized to view this resource") // if tenant is set in the context, verify that the user is a member of the tenant if tenant, ok := c.Get("tenant").(*sqlcv1.Tenant); ok { // ... GetTenantMemberByUserID, reject non-members ... }The bugmembership is checked only when a tenant was populated
When c.Get("tenant") is absent the if body never runs and the function returns success. Whether "tenant" is populated is driven entirely by the route’s declared resources in api-contracts/openapi/paths/v1/workflow-runs/workflow_run.yaml:
listDurableEventLog: get: x-resources: ["durable-task"] description: Lists all event log entries for a durable task. operationId: v1-durable-task:event-log:listThe bugroute omits tenant, so the membership check never runs
The handler then trusts the task it was handed and queries by that task’s own tenant id, with no check that the caller belongs to it. api/v1/server/handlers/v1/durable-tasks/event_log.go:
func (t *DurableTasksService) V1DurableTaskEventLogList(ctx echo.Context, request gen.V1DurableTaskEventLogListRequestObject) (gen.V1DurableTaskEventLogListResponseObject, error) { task := ctx.Get("durable-task").(*sqlcv1.V1TasksOlap) entries, err := t.config.V1.DurableEvents().ListDurableEventLog( ctx.Request().Context(), task.TenantID, task.InsertedAt, task.ID, limit, offset, )The bugqueries by the task's own tenant, not the caller's
Any account on the instance, in any tenant, can read another tenant’s durable task event logs by supplying a valid task UUID. My PoC, with an attacker in one tenant hitting a victim tenant’s task, returned HTTP 200 with log entries including a taskDisplayName of Process Customer Payment and a userMessage of VICTIM SECRET: Processing payment for user john@secret.com with card ending 4242. Beyond user messages the response leaks task display names, wait conditions and branching logic, timing data, and taskExternalId values usable to pivot to further tasks. This is the same cross-tenant disclosure class as the previously fixed GHSA-55gc-6fmc-fpx9 (listTasksByDAGIds), reappearing on a route that was never wired for tenant checks. It is a cross-tenant authorization failure (CWE-863): any authenticated user crosses the tenant boundary to read another tenant’s data.
Add "tenant" to the route’s resources so the populator sets it and the membership check actually fires:
listDurableEventLog: get:- x-resources: ["durable-task"]+ x-resources: ["tenant", "durable-task"]The deeper problem is that authorization fails open: a route missing "tenant" is silently trusted. validateUserTenantPermissions should default-deny, rejecting any route that names a tenant-scoped resource without also resolving a tenant to check it against.
Sanaan Fayaz Wani (GitHub sfwani) reported this vulnerability to the hatchet maintainers under coordinated disclosure and is credited as a reporter in GHSA-g26x-m427-f48f, published 2026-06-30.
All published findings: advisory index.