Sanaan Fayaz Wani

Budibase/budibase

GHSA-3c52-v5v2-3r56

SSRF in AI Table Generation via uploadUrl: raw fetch without blacklist protection

GHSA-3c52-v5v2-3r56

7.7

High

CVSS 3.1 base

  1. 2026-05-22Reported privately
  2. 118 days later2026-09-17Published by the maintainer

What to do

If you run budibase 3.41.0 and earlier, upgrade to a release after 3.41.0.

Anyone who can reach it over the network, with a low-privilege account and no user interaction, can read sensitive data, and the impact reaches beyond the vulnerable component.Read from the CVSS 3.1 vector

CVSS 3.1 metrics

To exploit it

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None

What it gets

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None
Scope
Changed

Open this vector in the FIRST calculator ↗

Weakness
CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery
CVE
not assigned
Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Also in budibase
CVE-2026-73301 4.3
2026-05-22Reported privately
118 days
2026-09-17Published by the maintainer

My analysis of this finding: root cause, the vulnerable code, the impact and the fix, in the site’s format. The official advisory of record is linked above.

Affected versions

Package Ecosystem Vulnerable Fixed in
budibase npm <= 3.41.0 > 3.41.0

Summary

Budibase builds attachment columns during AI table generation by downloading whatever URLs the model emits. The download path, uploadUrl in packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts, calls node-fetch directly with no SSRF guard, while every other outbound request in the codebase goes through fetchWithBlacklist. A builder-level user who steers the LLM toward an internal URL turns that gap into a full read server side request forgery, because the fetched body is stored and the storage URL handed back.

Where it lives

The sink is a bare fetch on an attacker influenced url, packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts:23:

const res = await fetch(url)  // raw fetch, no blacklist check

The bugfetches the model supplied url with no blacklist check

This is reached from POST /api/ai/tables. When the LLM generates table data that includes an attachment column, the URL in that column is passed straight into uploadUrl. The rest of the server routes outbound traffic through fetchWithBlacklist from @budibase/backend-core, which rejects private and link local IP ranges. uploadUrl is the one place that skips it, so the private range protection that exists everywhere else simply is not applied here.

Impact

The request body of whatever URL uploadUrl retrieves is written to object storage, and the resulting S3 style URL is returned to the caller. That makes this a full read SSRF rather than a blind pingback: an attacker does not just cause a request, they get the response back.

A builder influences the prompt or the generated table content so that an attachment URL points at an internal target, for example the cloud metadata service at 169.254.169.254 (AWS IMDSv1), an internal admin panel, or another service that is only reachable from the server’s network position. uploadUrl fetches it, stores the response, and returns a link the attacker can read. The practical payoff is reading cloud instance metadata and credentials, reaching internal only HTTP services, and exfiltrating responses that should never have left the trust boundary.

Scope note

I want to be precise about reach, because it bounds who is actually affected. In my notes this code path was present on the master branch and I did not confirm it in the v2.8.x release tags. The honest status is that the vulnerable fetch(url) and its /api/ai/tables trigger are real in the tree I reviewed, and the open question at the time of writing was which 3.x release first shipped it. That gate matters: code that only ever lived on a development branch has no installed users to harm.

Fix

Route this call through the same control everything else uses. Replace the raw fetch(url) in uploadUrl with fetchWithBlacklist so private, loopback and link local destinations are rejected before the request is made, and validate the URL scheme and host before download. There is no reason for this one download helper to bypass the blacklist the rest of the server already enforces.

The record

Weakness
CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery
Affected
budibase 3.41.0 and earlier
Fixed in
after 3.41.0
Disclosure
2026-05-22 Reported privately
118 days later2026-09-17 Published
Advisory
GHSA-3c52-v5v2-3r56
Also in budibase
CVE-2026-73301 4.3

About this writeup

Sanaan Fayaz Wani (GitHub sfwani) reported this vulnerability to the budibase maintainers under coordinated disclosure and is credited as a reporter in GHSA-3c52-v5v2-3r56, published 2026-09-17.

All published findings: advisory index.