Supervisor workload API lacks cross-tenant authentication
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Published, fixed and credited. Root cause, the vulnerable code, reproduction and the fix, as published in the advisory itself.
| Advisory | GHSA-jc26-22qp-cgqj |
| CVE | not assigned |
| Severity | High (7.9) |
| CVSS vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L |
| CWE | CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function) |
| Published | 2026-09-14 |
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
trigger.dev | npm | <= 4.6.0 | n/a |
The supervisor workload server accepts critical run-lifecycle requests without cryptographically authenticating the caller or verifying ownership of the targeted run. A workload with network access and knowledge of a valid run/snapshot pair can target runs belonging to another deployment.
File: apps/supervisor/src/workloadServer/index.ts
The HTTP server created at lines 157-470 exposes these endpoints with NO authentication:
POST /api/v1/workload-actions/runs/:runId/snapshots/:snapshotId/attempts/startPOST /api/v1/workload-actions/runs/:runId/snapshots/:snapshotId/attempts/completePOST /api/v1/workload-actions/runs/:runId/snapshots/:snapshotId/heartbeatGET /api/v1/workload-actions/runs/:runId/snapshots/:snapshotId/suspendGET /api/v1/workload-actions/runs/:runId/snapshots/:snapshotId/continueThe supervisor forwards these requests upstream using its privileged worker credentials, creating a confused-deputy path. In particular, attempts/start can return resolved environment variables and a newly issued run JWT.
The /workload Socket.IO namespace checks only for caller-supplied identity headers and allows callers to bind known run IDs without verifying that the run belongs to the claimed deployment.
# Requires network access and a known current run/snapshot pair.
curl -X POST \
http://supervisor:8020/api/v1/workload-actions/runs/run_XXXX/snapshots/snap_XXXX/attempts/start \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "x-trigger-workload-runner-id: attacker" \
-d '{"isWarmStart":false}'
Targeted cross-deployment and potentially cross-tenant run manipulation. An attacker with network access and a valid run/snapshot pair may start or complete another run, interfere with its lifecycle, or obtain its resolved environment variables and run JWT. Run and snapshot IDs have high entropy, and the workload API does not provide a working enumeration primitive.
The managed service now authenticates workloads using signed deployment-scoped tokens and scopes sensitive worker actions to the verified environment. Requests targeting runs in another environment are rejected. The obsolete deployment-scoped dequeue proxy has also been removed.
Sanaan Fayaz Wani (GitHub sfwani) reported this vulnerability to the trigger.dev maintainers under coordinated disclosure and is credited as a reporter in GHSA-jc26-22qp-cgqj, published 2026-09-14.
All published findings: advisory index.