Budibase: Missing RBAC on GET /api/global/groups allows BASIC users to enumerate all tenant groups and role mappings
4.3
Medium
CVSS 3.1 base
What to do
If you run @budibase/server 3.38.1 and earlier, no fixed version is listed in the advisory.
Anyone who can reach it over the network, with a low-privilege account and no user interaction, can read some data.Read from the CVSS 3.1 vector
To exploit it
What it gets
My analysis of this finding: root cause, the vulnerable code, the impact and the fix, in the site’s format. The official advisory of record is linked above.
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
@budibase/server | npm | <= 3.38.1 | n/a |
Budibase’s worker service exposes GET /api/global/groups, which lists every user group in the tenant along with its role mappings, member list and builder permissions. Unlike the sibling routes on the same router, this one carries no role check. Any authenticated user, including a plain BASIC role with no administrative standing, can call it and read the organisation’s entire group structure. This is tracked as GHSA-4qcj-m5wp-jmf4 / CVE-2026-73301.
The route is declared in packages/worker/src/api/routes/global/groups.ts (lines 40 to 44). The list handler is gated only by a feature flag, requireFeature(Feature.USER_GROUPS), and no authorization middleware. The contrast with its neighbours on the same router is what makes the omission clear rather than intentional:
POST /api/global/groups -> auth.adminOnlyGET /api/global/groups/:groupId -> auth.builderOrAdminGET /api/global/groups -> requireFeature(Feature.USER_GROUPS) onlyThe buglist route has a feature flag but no role check
Creating a group requires admin. Reading a single group by id requires builder or admin. Reading the full list of all groups requires neither. The feature flag decides whether the groups feature is on, not who is allowed to call the endpoint, so once the feature is enabled the list is readable by anyone with a session.
A BASIC user is the lowest trust authenticated principal in a Budibase tenant, and this endpoint hands that user a map of the whole access control model. The response discloses group names, the users who belong to each group, the role each group grants, and whether a group confers builder level permissions. That is the organisational structure and the authorization policy of the deployment.
Concretely, a low privilege account can enumerate who the privileged users are, which groups to target for escalation, and how roles are assigned across the tenant, all without any admin or builder grant. On its own it is an information disclosure, but it is exactly the reconnaissance that precedes a targeted privilege escalation or social engineering attempt, since it tells an attacker which identities are worth going after. It is a missing-authorization information disclosure (CWE-862): a low privilege account reads data the role model should have kept to admins and builders.
Apply the same middleware the rest of the router already uses. The list handler should require at least auth.builderOrAdmin, matching the single group read at GET /api/global/groups/:groupId, so that enumerating every group is no weaker than reading one. The feature flag should stay as a capability gate, but authorization needs to be a separate, explicit check on this route rather than an absent one.
Sanaan Fayaz Wani (GitHub sfwani) reported this vulnerability to the @budibase/server maintainers under coordinated disclosure and is credited as a reporter in GHSA-4qcj-m5wp-jmf4, published 2026-07-22.
All published findings: advisory index.